As the author of Article XIV of the state constitution, a section that streamlined the amendment process, thereby facilitating improvements in judicial selection and the adoption of separation of powers, and one that also established procedures for a decennial referendum on the calling of a constitutional convention, I would be remiss if I remained silent with regard to the current question of whether or not to call a constitutional convention.

Naturally I favor a yes vote on the question of authorizing a constitutional convention.  Much has transpired in the nearly four decades since the last convention that can best be addressed by an open convention of the people.

In the process of writing our 155,000-word analysis of all 121 sections of the existing constitution, (The Rhode Island Constitution:  A Reference Guide, Oxford University Press, 2007), Justice Robert Flanders and I discovered a number of inconsistencies, obsolete provisions, and vacuums in power and authority that need correction.

These technical issues are in addition to much-publicized changes such as the item veto, the establishment of the post of auditor general to oversee state spending, stronger Ethics Commission supervision of the General Assembly, legislative redistricting reform, term limits for judges and legislators, judicial magistrate selection, restoration of the state’s original name, and the establishment of education as a fundamental right (something reformer Thomas Dorr advocated in his People’s Constitution of 1841).

However, this commentary is written primarily to address the fear of convention opponents.  One negative argument suggests that a constitutional convention puts civil rights “at risk.”  History emphatically proves the opposite.  Our Article I – “Declaration of Certain Constitutional Rights and Principles” – by its placement demonstrates the primary concern of our constitutional drafters for individual liberty.  The 1973 convention (in which I served as secretary and delegate) expanded voting rights.  The 1986 convention (in which I served as general counsel to the president) ensured the people’s rights to our shoreline (Section 17); protected private property rights in cases of eminent domain (Section 16); banned any law abridging the freedom of speech (Section 21); gave rights to victims of crime (Section 23); and added a concluding provision (Section 24) to embrace the concept that the Rhode Island Constitution is to be interpreted as expanding and not limiting individual rights, even though similar rights in the U.S. Constitution may be more narrowly defined.  So much for conventions as threats to civil rights!

Despite this record of rights expansion, a handful of delegates from the 1986 Convention once described that assemblage as “hijacked” by legislators and special interests.  I did not see any inordinate influence from either.  As I recollect, the 1964-69 Convention (in which I served as research advisor) had three incumbent legislators and one sitting judge, and the 1973 convention had three incumbent state senators; but I do not recall any incumbent state legislators serving as delegates to the 1986 Convention.  Nonetheless, I would favor barring incumbent general officers,  judges,  state legislators and council persons from running as a delegate to the next convention.  Their election would be a form of dual office holding. 

Others have criticized the procedure whereby convention delegates must be selected from House of Representative districts.  How was I to provide for delegate election if not from existing voting districts apportioned in accordance with the one-man, one-vote principle?  The alternative – statewide election – is not only impractical, it is ludicrous.  It would magnify the cost of running, favor those with previous statewide exposure (for good and ill), create a sectional imbalance, and increase the work of campaigning 75-fold.

I would have preferred that the present twelve-person study commission made room for constitutional scholars and political scientists.  However, in the end, my version of Article XIV, drawn in part from Thomas Wilson Dorr’s bypassed People’s Constitution of 1841, lets the people decide.  They choose the delegates and they vote separately on each suggested amendment.  Fearmongers have no faith in the people.

Patrick T. Conley,  historian laureate and attorney, is the author of Article XIV allowing the people to call for a constitutional convention